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CEO compensation has received a great deal of attention from the public in 
recent years owing to the strong increase of CEO pay and the widespread use of 
stock options. Both of these issues are intertwined as the remarkable increase of CEO 
compensation is due to the emergence of stock options associated with greater other 
components of compensation.  This evolution  has contributed to favor a common 
view according to which CEOs would be overpaid. It might indeed be the case that 
greater CEO compensation, by increasing inequality, hampers welfare, given that 
most people are reluctant to accept inequality. However in order to know if CEOs are 
overpaid,  an investigation from the firm perspective  is needed  to  check whether 
increased CEO compensation is beneficial for companies in the sense that ultimate 
benefits exceed costs of CEO compensation. It is indeed of utmost interest to check 
whether there are economic justifications for high levels of CEO compensation. This   3 
leads to the issue of the existence of a positive link between CEO compensation and 
firm performance. 
Theoretical arguments in favor of such a link are all based on agency theory, 
following the separation of ownership and management in publicly traded 
companies (Berle and Means, 1932). An agency conflict therefore emerges between 
the manager and the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managers may use 
their discretionary power to gain some personal benefits through a variety of means, 
including empire building, entrenchment strategies, and also reduction of their effort 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Consequently, executive compensation plans should be 
designed to align the interests of executives with those of shareholders. 
In other words, such plans should be implemented  so that executive 
compensation  is influenced  by their efforts and their ability in managerial 
performance, as summarized by Murphy (1986, p.60): “the level of managerial effort 
chosen by an executive depends on his incentive contract”. This so-called “optimal 
contracting  approach” considers  that executive  compensation schemes would be 
designed to favor managerial performance by providing them incentives to provide 
their optimal effort. Therefore, according to this view and to the assumption of 
rationality of shareholders leading to optimal compensation  arrangements, we 
should observe a positive impact of CEO compensation on managerial performance. 
However Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004) contest this view by developing the 
argument that executive compensation is not an instrument to address the agency 
problem, but a consequence of this problem. Indeed, they consider that executive 
compensation reflects in fact the discretionary power of managers. Consequently, 
greater compensation would not favor better managerial performance, but would be 
the result of stronger managerial power. 
As a result, we should not observe a positive relationship between CEO 
compensation and managerial performance, as performance would not influence 
CEO compensation. We could  even expect a negative link  if we consider that 
stronger managerial power is linked to both greater CEO compensation and greater 
relaxing of effort. 
There is  consequently  a strong need for evidence on the impact of CEO 
compensation on managerial performance in order to assess the relevance of greater 
CEO compensation and of stock options.   4 
The empirical literature is however not very helpful on this topic. Indeed, most 
papers focus on the opposite link according to which greater performance should 
favor greater compensation, as surveyed by Murphy (1999). Hall and Liebman (1998) 
notably investigate the sensitivity of CEO compensation to variations of the stock 
price. The underlying motivation  of these studies is  to check  whether managers 
really benefit from positive changes of the stock price resulting from their decisions. 
While such relationship is very likely for components of compensation dealing with 
stock price (CEO holdings of stock and stock options), one could wonder whether 
other components such as salary and bonus are influenced by stock performance. 
The conclusion of this literature is that CEO pay is influenced by stock performance 
almost only through changes in the value of CEO holdings, meaning not through 
changes in other components. 
Such literature reveals interesting evidence on the link between compensation 
and firm performance, by explaining whether firm performance influences 
compensation and how. But it only provides indirect information on the incentives 
generated with compensation for performance. Indeed the fact that compensation is 
influenced by firm performance suggests that CEOs are motivated to perform well. 
Nevertheless, such view assumes a perfect rationality of CEOs regarding this link, 
and notably through salary. 
Consequently, the investigation of the incentives generated with compensation 
for firm performance requires a more direct analysis, looking into the magnitude of 
the influence of CEO compensation on firm performance. 
A notable paper on this topic is Habib and Ljungqvist (2005). They adopt the 
frontier efficiency techniques to estimate the ratio of the optimal Tobin’s Q to the 
current Tobin’s Q for a large sample of US companies. They consider that such ratio 
estimates the magnitude of agency costs between managers and shareholders. They 
are  subsequently able to investigate whether stock components of CEO 
compensation (stocks and stock options) contribute to exert a positive impact on firm 
value by reducing agency  costs. They support the role of incentives through 
stockholdings and optionholdings on the ability to reach the optimal Tobin’s Q. 
Therefore, this paper brings evidence on the impact of CEO compensation but it does 
not directly estimate managerial performance, using a proxy through the ability to 
reach the optimal Tobin’s Q.  Furthermore, it does not investigate the possible 
influence of non-stock components of compensation.   5 
The aim of our  paper is to provide new evidence on the impact of CEO 
compensation on managerial performance. Our contribution is based on two major 
additions to this literature.  The first addition is the use of frontier efficiency 
techniques to estimate managerial performance. That is to say, a production frontier 
is estimated which allows the comparison of each firm to the best-practice 
companies.  As a result, the technical efficiency score assesses  how close a firm’s 
production  is to what a firm’s optimal production would be for using the same 
bundle of inputs. It therefore brings information on the managerial performance of 
the firm. To this end, we adopt the Battese and Coelli (1995)’s stochastic frontier 
model allowing to assess the link between CEO compensation and technical 
efficiency. 
The second addition is the use of an extensive dataset,  which  contains 
information on all components of executive compensation on a large panel of US 
public firms. This dataset allows investigating the differentiated impact on 
managerial  performance of each component  of compensation, meaning  mainly 
salary, annual bonus, option grants and stocks grants, and changes in the value of 
stock-options. 
As a consequence,  our paper answers two fundamental questions for the 
understanding of the incentives connected with CEO compensation: is greater CEO 
compensation associated with greater managerial  performance? Have all 
components of compensation the same impact on managerial performance? 
Both questions are of utmost interest owing to their normative implications for 
corporate governance. Thus a positive answer to the first question might provide 
some support for the absence of a ceiling for CEO compensation. Furthermore, the 
answer to the second question gives some insights to the economic justification of the 
expansion of  stock-options for the regulator. It will also give information to 
shareholders on which components of compensation should be enhanced to improve 
managerial performance. They may consequently be able to implement an optimal 
executive compensation scheme in terms of compensation costs for the company. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology 
used for the efficiency measures. Section 3 describes the data and variables. In section 
4, we develop the empirical results. Finally, we provide some concluding remarks in 
section 5. 
   6 
2. Methodology 
 
Our paper aims at investigating the relationship between CEO compensation 
and managerial performance. Therefore we have first to obtain measures of 
managerial performance. To this end,  we use frontier efficiency techniques. 
Following seminal works by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Charnes, Cooper 
and Rhodes (1978), these methods provide sophisticated measures of managerial 
performance, the efficiency scores. 
We adopt the stochastic frontier approach to estimate efficiency scores. Several 
advantages can be argued in favor of this approach. First, it provides synthetic 
measures of performance. Indeed, unlike basic productivity measures (e.g. output 
per employee), the efficiency scores computed with the stochastic frontier approach 
allow to include several input and output dimensions in the  evaluation of 
performances. Second, it computes relative measures of performance. That is, a 
production frontier is estimated which allows the comparison of each firm to the 
best-practice companies. As a result, the technical efficiency score assesses how close 
a firm’s production is to what a firm’s optimal production would be for using the 
same bundle of inputs. It then directly provides a relative measure of performance. 
Third, efficiency frontiers take the scale effects into account. Indeed, with 
standard productivity ratios, the existence of scale economies may benefit large firms 
in terms of performance. With technical  efficiency scores, the scale effects are 
disentangled from the “pure” performance measures. Fourth, whereas total factor 
productivity  measures assess performance by the whole residual from the 
production frontier for each country, the  stochastic frontier approach allows to 
disentangle the distance to the production frontier between an inefficiency term and 
a random error, taking into account exogenous events. 
The basic model of the stochastic frontier approach assumes that production 
deviates from the optimal production by  a random disturbance, v, and an 
inefficiency term, u. Thus the production frontier is Y = f(X) + ε where Y represents 
production, X is the vector of inputs, and ε the error term which is the difference 
between  v and of u. u is a one-sided component representing technical inefficiencies, 
meaning the degree of weakness of managerial performance. v  is  a two-sided 
component representing random disturbances, reflecting luck or measurement 
errors.  u  and  v  are independently distributed. v  is assumed to have a normal   7 
distribution with zero mean and variance σv².  u  is assumed to have a truncated 
normal with m mean and variance σu². According to Jondrow et al. [1982], firm-
specific estimates of inefficiency terms can be calculated by using the distribution of 
the inefficiency term conditional upon the estimate of the composite error term. 
The investigation of the determinants of efficiency can be done following 
several procedures. The more straightforward procedure is the so-called “two-stage 
procedure”: the stochastic frontier model is estimated in the first stage, while the 
obtained efficiency scores are regressed on a set of explanatory variables including 
compensation in the second stage. Although often applied in the literature, there are 
two important econometric problems with this two-stage procedure, as observed by 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). First, it assumes that the efficiency terms are 
identically distributed in the estimation of the stochastic frontier model of the first 
stage, while in the second stage this assumption is contradicted by the fact that the 
regression of the efficiency terms on the explanatory variables suggests that the 
efficiency terms are not identically distributed. Second, the explanatory variables 
must be assumed as uncorrelated with the variables of the production frontier, or 
else the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the production frontier 
would be biased because of the omission of the explanatory variables in the first 
stage. But then, the estimated efficiency terms that are explained in the second stage 
are biased estimates, as they are estimated relative to a biased representation of the 
production frontier. 
Therefore, we rather adopt the “one-stage procedure” proposed by Battese and 
Coelli (1995), which solves these econometric problems. They propose a procedure 
using panel data, in which the non-negative inefficiency term is assumed to have a 
truncated distribution with different means for each firm. As a result, the 
distributions of the inefficiency terms are not the same, but are expressed as 
functions of explanatory variables. The inefficiency terms are then independently but 
not identically distributed. They are obtained by truncation at zero of the N(µit , σu²) 
distribution: µit = zit δ, where zit is a vector of explanatory variables, and δ a vector of 
parameters to be estimated. 
The estimated model includes then two equations: a production  frontier 
function specified in equation (1), and an equation to explain the inefficiencies 
specified in equation (2). We adopt the translog specification  for the production 
frontier. The model is then specified as follows:   8 
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where i company, t year, Y production, L labor, K physical capital, ε the composite 
error term. 
uit =δ zit + Wit          (2) 
where uit is the inefficiency, zit is a p*1 vector of explanatory variables, δ is a 1*p 
vector of parameters to be estimated, Wit  the random variable defined by the 
truncation of the normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ² (σ² = σu² + σv²). 
 
3. Data and variables 
 
3.1. Data 
Our final sample includes about 1,109 CEO of US non-financial firms. The 
sample covers 1992-2002. Given the unbalanced structure of our data, our final sample 
consists of a total of 5,224 CEO-year observations, representing 948 different firms1
In order to measure efficiency for each firm, we need to have the balance sheet 
and income statement of these firms. We thus extract the financial statements for each 
firm and each year from the Compustat Industrial USA database, edited by Standard & 
Poor’s. 
. 
Given the goals of our empirical study, we also need to know the compensation 
as well as the precise composition of the compensation package for each CEO. These 
CEO compensation data are extracted from the Compustat ExecuComp database, also 
edited by Standard & Poor’s. 
Both  databases are then matched, by year, firm and CEO. We only keep 
observations on data coming from the two sources. We then limit our analysis to non-
financial companies in order to have a homogenous sample of firms in terms of 
financial structure. To this end, we drop out of our sample banks, insurance 
companies and other financial companies (sectors 45 to 48 in the Fama and French 
(1997) classification). Firms with non-reported industry code are also set aside from 
our sample. We also exclude another set of observations, namely, when there are less 
than 3 observations available for a given CEO. 
                                                         
1 The number of firms is smaller than the number of CEOs, since many firms have had more than one 
CEO during the time period under study.   9 
We adopted the Tukey box-plot, based on the use of interquartile range, in order 
to clean the sample data from outliers. Observations with values out of the range 
defined by the first and third quartiles more or less two times the interquartile range 
were excluded for the four following ratios: fixed annual salary to sales, total cash 
compensation to  net  sales, sales to labor, sales to physical capital. Following this 
procedure, 1,710 observations are drop out of the sample, leaving our final sample 
with 5,224 observations. 
 
3.2. Variables 
In order to estimate the relationship  between CEO compensation and firm 
efficiency, it is necessary to define variables for input and output quantities for the 
production frontier estimation. We also have to choose CEO compensation-related 
variables (i.e. explanatory variables) and control variables for the equation relating 
inefficiency scores to explanatory variables. These three sets of variables are presented 
in this subsection. The subsection will conclude with usual sample and variable 
descriptive statistics. 
We must define input and output quantities for the estimation of the production 
frontier. We consider one output, production, and two inputs, labor and physical 
capital. Production is measured by net sales. Labor is measured by the number of 
employees, while physical capital  is defined as the amortization and depreciation 
expenses. 
To take into account the potential effect of time and industry-related specific 
features, we also add to our explanatory variables time and industry dummies. In 
order to limit the number of explanatory variables, we only include 9 industry 
dummies, following the first digit of the main SIC code for each firm. 
Next to the production frontier, our model includes an equation relating 
inefficiencies  to CEO compensation elements and some control variables. In 
consequence, we must have a set of variables related to the CEO compensation 
package. These variables should be designed to detect ‘incentives’ provided to the 
CEO by the shareholders. 
The traditional CEO compensation package includes a cash component and a 
stock component. To understand its composition, one must note that it is the sum of 
up to six different elements:   10 
-A fixed annual salary, decided by the board of directors or more frequently by 
an ad-hoc Compensation Committee. 
-An annual bonus (paid or accrued), subject to the achievement of one or more 
specific goals, frequently directly related to the firm performance (measured as of 
financial and/or industrial performance…). 
-One or more grants each year of employee stock-options (ESO) and/or 
restricted shares; these grants are in general subject to a “vesting period”, of 4 years 
on average for the stock-options. That is: stock-options granted in 1996 for instance 
can not be exercised before 2000. Following the same logic, restricted shares must be 
held for a minimum of four years before they can be sold.  
-These grants can be, or not, provided in a Long Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) 
framework: under an LTIP, the CEO is typically provided with free shares, subject to 
certain conditions such as remaining in employment throughout a given period of 
time and if the company met certain performance conditions over the same period. 
-One or more items among the following: extra cash, stock or retirement 
benefits, for special instances, such as hiring (golden hello), firing (golden parachute), 
retirement, and so on. 
-The participation in an employee benefit plan and the right to special benefits, 
including life insurance and supplemental executive retirement plans (the so-called 
‘SERP’s). 
We exclude the last two elements from our following comments and analyses, 
because of absence of any information on these items. Turning to other compensation 
items, it’s straightforward to define variables for base salary (Salary)  and annual 
bonus (Bonus), since these data are provided directly by ExecuComp. These variables 
are thus simply the annual dollar value of the compensation element. The LTIP-
related variable (LTIP) is equally easy to define, because even these plans measure 
company performance over a period of more than one year (generally three years), the 
amount paid out to the executive under the LTIP is provided by Execucomp and not 
subject to subsequent changes or adjustments2
It’s more difficult to define the variables related to employee stock options 
(ESO). The main difficulties arise from (i) the potential divergent appreciations of the 
stock options’ value, (ii) the difficulties to correctly value the CEO portfolio of stock-
. 
                                                         
2 This variable is related only to cash paid out to the CEO under the LTIP. Other forms of payments 
(restricted or free stocks …) are included in the following variables, Stocks and Options.   11 
options and (iii) specific features of stock-options which make hard to define the real 
‘incentives’ given to the CEO by the stock-options. 
(i) Several ESO valuation models coexist. The main model of option valuation, 
the Black-Scholes and Merton model (see Black and Scholes, 1973 and Merton, 1973), 
relies upon several hypotheses for which ESOs are not complying. Among all specific 
features of ESOs, ESOs can only be exercised at the completion of a so-called ‘vesting’ 
period, ESOs are frequently non-transferable, subject to stated restrictions, etc. In 
consequence, ESOs contain specific features that make them substantially different 
from publicly traded stock options. Above all, one can imagine that, contrary to the 
B&S main assumption, executives are not well diversified, since a high portion of their 
wealth is invested in stock and ESO of the firm they manage. These ESOs, computed 
under the risk-free and no-arbitrage hypotheses with the B&S formula, could then be 
over-priced3
(ii) The second problem is related to the valuation of the option portfolio: for a 
given year, an executive owns stock-options from previous grants. If the executive 
was already present in our database the year of the previous grant, it’s easy for us to 
compute the value of his portfolio. The problem arises when the options were granted 
before the addition of the CEO to the database. In this case, some assumptions upon 
the CEO behavior have to be made (see appendix B for details), following the Habib 
and Ljungqvist (2006) method. 
. Alternative models are available, but they also rely upon data that is not 
available for us, such as the total wealth of the CEO. We therefore choose to use the 
Black-Scholes formula to value them, following nearly all previous studies on the 
subject (see appendix B for details about hypotheses and models used to value the 
ESOs portfolio and the stock portfolio) and the FASB 123 proposal. 
(iii) Last, several alternative variables can be defined. The incentives given to a 
CEO by a stock-option portfolio could be measured by the change in value of this 
portfolio  –  the average delta of the stock-options (Delta).  Delta then measures the 
partial derivative of the Black-Scholes stock-option value with respect to the value of 
the underlying stock. Therefore Delta measures the incentives given by stock options 
to CEOs. They could also be measured by the stock-option’s vega (Vega), that is the 
partial derivative of the Black-Scholes stock-option value with respect to the volatility 
of the underlying stock. Indeed it is well-known that if firm managers are risk-averse 
or if they have under-diversified portfolios (because of an excessive share of their   12 
wealth invested in the managed firm), CEOs will tend to choose lower risk projects 
(i.e. with lower expected NPV) rather than optimal projects (i.e. with maximal NPV). 
Boards may decide to award stock-options to make managers’ wealth more sensitive 
to risk taking. To create such incentives, the awarded options must have a value 
narrowly linked to firm risk (Guay, 1999). This link could therefore be proxied with 
Vega, which measures the sensitivity of option value to volatility and then assesses 
whether managers are incited to invest in risky projects. The incentives could also be 
measured by the dollar value of the total portfolio held of stock options (TotalOptions), 
or  the value of the annual  option  grant  (YearOptions). As both latter variables are 
directly related, we will use them alternatively in our empirical study. 
The same variables can be computed for the restricted and non-restricted stocks. 
Here, the computation of the portfolio value and its evolution is straightforward, since 
all needed information is provided. The variables are TotalStocks, the total dollar value 
of all the (restricted or not) stocks of the CEO portfolio, and YearStocks, the total dollar 
value of stocks grants to the CEO one given year. We again use alternatively these 
variables as they are correlated. 
Finally, we also adopt a measure of total compensation  (TotalCompensation), 
which is the sum of all components of compensation received during one year. In 
other words, total compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, LTIP, the value of the 
annual option grant, and the value of the annual stocks grant. 
The other explanatory variables are control variables that take corporate 
governance and industry-related factors into account. Corporate governance issues 
are controlled with three variables. Shareholders is the log of the number of registered 
shareholders in thousands. BoardMeetings is the number of Board meetings during the 
year. The underlying justification for choosing these proxies for corporate governance 
is that firms with small number of shareholders (Monsen et al., 1968 and Kamerschen, 
1968) and/or with frequent board meetings should have less autonomous or 
entrenched CEOs (see Byrd and Hickman, 1992). The third control variable is related 
to the CEO himself: Dismissed  is equal to 1 if the CEO has been dismissed (not 
necessarily the year considered) from the firm and 0 otherwise. CEO that are or will 
be dismissed can be expected to under-perform, all else being equal, compared to 
other CEOs (see Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985 and Warner et al., 1988). 
                                                                                                                                                                 
3 See Hall and Murphy (2002) or Finnerty (2003).   13 
Industry-related factors are controlled through  three variables. Leverage 
indicates the leverage ratio of the firm and is measured by the ratio of total debt to 
total assets. Rating is related to the quality of the borrower. A higher value of the 
variable means a lower credit quality4. Additionally, we include a variable to take the 
term structure of liabilities: CurrentLiabilities, defined as the ratio of short-term 
liabilities to total liabilities. 
 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics. The main variables of interest are related 
to CEO compensation. Our study relies upon 1,109 CEOs of 948 large American firms, 
which pay their CEOs a salary and a bonus that respectively average approximately 
625,000 and 574,000 dollars per year (see table 1 for descriptive statistics about CEO 
compensations). As it is well-known, stock option grants are the largest component of 
compensation, at least if they are valued according to the Merton corrected Black and 
Scholes formula. The firms included in our sample granted options with an average 
Black-Scholes value of nearly USD 2.79m each year, but the median is far more 
modest at only USD 937,000. This divergence can be explained by the presence of 
some extremely large maximum grant values. The largest grant in our database was 
provided to Thomas Siebel (USD 294m in 2000), the CEO of Siebel Systems, Inc. 
Turning to total compensation, the average value is USD 4.59 m (median: 2.38 
m), of which base salary accounts for approximately 25%, annual bonus 15% and 
stock-options about 40%. Over the time period 1992-2003, the average annual growth 
rate of CEO total compensation is clearly higher than the average growth rate of 
wages in the economy: about 9.5% in our sample. Over the same period, the variable 
(incentive) part of the compensation has more than doubled. One can  in fact 
distinguish two sub-periods. The first one lasts from 1992 to 2000, with a strong and 
continuous increase in total average compensation. Over that  period, the average 
annual growth rate is higher than 12%. In the period 2001-2003, the annual growth 
rate fall, with the stock market collapse, the introduction of new accountancy 
standards in the US (making stock-options more expensive for firms) and an increased 
vigilance of the shareholders and the public opinion following excesses of the 
previous period. 
                                                         
4 This variable takes values from 1 to 6, according to the firm’s long term rating, from AAA (coded 1) 
to D (coded 6). Original credit scores come from Standard and Poor’s.   14 
Turning to the descriptive statistics of firms, usual descriptive statistics of the 
population of firms are provided in table 1. The largest firm in our sample is General 
Electric Co. (net sales around USD 100b) and the smallest is Verity Inc. (net sales of 
USD 64m). Table 1 gives additional details about firms included in our sample. Our 
sample shows a bias towards large firms, which results from the fact it only contains 
listed firms. It does not represent a severe problem for our investigation as our focus 
deals with the cost in efficiency of the separation between control and property, which 




The discussion of our results is structured as follows. In the first subsection, we 
estimate the stochastic frontier model including CEO compensation as a possible 




We estimate the stochastic frontier model in which compensation components 
are included as explanatory variables of inefficiency. Table 2 displays our results. 
The first lines exhibit the coefficients of the estimated production frontier, whereas 
the lower part of the table is devoted to the coefficients of the equation in which 
inefficiency is explained. One has to keep in mind that a minus sign indicates that an 
increase in the explanatory variable leads  to  less inefficiency, that is a rise in 
efficiency.  Several  specifications have been tested, which differ on the tested 
compensation variables. 
Our first specification includes TotalCompensation  as the only tested 
compensation variable in order to investigate the full impact of CEO compensation 
on managerial performance (column 1). This estimation  shows a  negative and 
significant influence of compensation  on inefficiency, suggesting that greater 
compensation enhances managerial performance. This finding is in accordance with 
the view of Murphy (1986) according to which compensation contracts can be 
designed to enhance managerial performance.   15 
We can however wonder whether cash components or stock components of 
CEO compensation all  exert a  positive influence on managerial performance.  We 
then adopt a breakdown of CEO  compensation to investigate the differentiated 
impact of components of executive compensation on performance. We include both 
cash components and stock components. Cash components are Salary,  Bonus  and 
LTIP. Regarding stock components, we include Delta,  Vega, and alternatively 
TotalStocks and TotalOptions (column 2), or YearStocks and YearOptions (column 3). 
The main conclusion of these estimations is the differentiated impact of 
components of compensation on managerial performance. Among the cash 
components, Salary and Bonus have significantly negative coefficients, whereas LTIP 
is not significant. We therefore tend to support the view that greater  salary and 
bonus  enhance managerial performance. Furthermore, greater  compensation 
through grants in the Long Term Incentive Plan is useless in terms of incentives for 
performance, and should rather be replaced by greater salary or bonus. 
Among the stock components, a clear distinction emerges between stocks and 
stock options. Indeed, the variables TotalOptions  and  YearOptions  are respectively 
negative and significant in specifications (2) and (3), while the variables TotalStocks 
and YearStocks are not significant in the specifications. These findings tend to justify 
grants  of stock-options to managers in the aim of enhancing  managerial 
performance. Grants of stocks are useless in comparison,  as they do not provide 
incentives to favor managerial performance. As a consequence, we provide economic 
justifications for the recent expansion of stock options granted to managers. 
Finally, we observe that Delta and Vega have opposite effects on managerial 
performance. That is, Vega favors performance, which means that greater incentives 
to invest in risky projects benefits to performance. However a greater Delta hampers 
performance, supporting the view that stronger incentives provided by stock options 
are prejudicial to performance. This result is counter-intuitive but might come from 
the fact that greater Delta incites managers to take lower risk, as their portfolio is 
particularly sensitive to the changes in stock price and already well-valuated since 
high Delta stock-options are by definition deep in the money options, with high 
intrinsic value.5
                                                         
5 By the way, the deep out of the money stock-options do not give either incentives to CEOs, since the 
expected pay-off from these options is zero (zero intrinsic value and time value is near zero) and the 
sensibility of these options to underlying price changes is very low (delta near zero). Stock-option 
repricings, which frequently occur when such stock-options are out of the money, can then be 
   16 
Regarding the control variables, we observe a positive and significant link 
between Leverage and managerial performance. This result should be related to Weill 
(2003), investigating the relationship between leverage on firm performance, also 
measured with frontier efficiency techniques,  in  France, Germany, and Italy. He 
found that this link varies across countries, according to the institutional 
environment, and also observes a positive link similar to ours in two of the three 
analyzed countries. Such positive influence results from the signaling role of debt to 
solve adverse selection problems between firms and lenders, and from the binding 
nature of debt raising the pressure on managers to perform. 
As expected, we point out a positive relationship between  a good  Rating, 
assessing the credit quality of the firm, and a good managerial performance. The 
share of current liabilities in total liabilities,  CurrentLiabilities, is also positively 
related to managerial performance, which can be explained by the fact that short-
term debt has a more binding role than long-term  debt in terms of enhanced 
pressures on managers to perform. 
The positive and significant impact of the number of shareholders, Shareholders, 
on  managerial  performance  is in accordance with the reduction in autonomy for 
managers – and consequently in their entrenchment possibilities – led by a larger 
number of shareholders.  Finally, the number of board meetings  during the year 
(BoardMeetings) and the recent dismission of a CEO (Dismissed) are not significant. 
Therefore, our main findings support the “optimal contracting approach” in 
accordance with Murphy (1986), according to which executive compensation would 
be designed to favor managerial performance. Indeed we find that annual salary, 
annual bonus, and option grants contribute to enhance managerial performance. Our 
results are however a little more contrasted than  those which could have been 
expected following the use of compensation to align the incentives of executives with 
the interests of shareholders. Indeed, while we observe some positive influence for 
option grant, bonus, and salary, all components which could have been designed to 
align these incentives, we do not observe a positive impact of stocks on performance. 
This qualifies the incentive effect of the ownership of stocks by managers. 
Our conclusion is thus in contradiction with the view of Bebchuk and Fried 
(2003, 2004) according to which executive compensation would not exert an impact 
                                                                                                                                                                 
explained in the same sense: to give the CEO more incentives without another stock-options’ grant, 
changing (lowering) the strike price is a convenient way to increase the Delta of these stock-options.   17 
on managerial performance. That is, this view expects no positive link between CEO 
compensation and managerial performance, as manager’s pay arrangements would 
be shaped by managerial power. 
As a consequence, our findings provide support for raising CEO compensation 
to enhance managerial performance. Robustness tests are however needed to confirm 
this main conclusion. 
 
4.2. Robustness checks 
We  perform several robustness checks to test the relevance of our main 
findings. In all robustness tests, we display results from the model specification with 
the breakdown of executive compensation including YearStocks and YearOptions. This 
is our benchmark specification. 
First, we investigate the possibility of reverse causality. Indeed, while we test 
the impact of CEO compensation on managerial performance, one might consider 
that managerial performance may influence CEO compensation. Such relationship is 
not obvious as our measure of firm performance is technical  efficiency, which 
considers the ability of a firm to produce the maximal output.  In other words, 
profitability measures of performance are very likely to influence compensation 
components  such as bonus, owing to the scheme incentives in connection with 
profitability. However technical  efficiency scores are not  directly  related to CEO 
compensation. 
In order to tackle this issue, we re-estimate  the model by replacing 
compensation of the year by compensation of the previous year. That is to say we 
now investigate whether compensation of year (t-1) influences performance of year 
(t). This estimation is displayed in table 3. Most compensation components still have 
the same coefficients than in the benchmark estimation. As such, we observe that 
coefficients for all cash components (Salary, Bonus, LTIP) have the same sign and 
significance. As Salary and Bonus still have negative and significant coefficients, this 
finding therefore supports the fact that the causality is  undoubtedly from 
compensation to managerial performance. 
Furthermore coefficients of Delta and Vega keep the same signs, respectively 
positive and negative ones. Differences can however be pointed out for YearOptions 
and  YearStocks. The coefficient for YearOptions  remains negative but lacks 
significance. On the other hand, the coefficient for YearStocks remains positive but   18 
gains significance. Consequently, these findings suggest ambiguous  causality 
between  compensation through option grants  and managerial performance. Such 
result can be explained by the fact that stock options are related to firm performance, 
even if we measure performance through cost measures and not profit measures. 
Regarding YearStocks, it may mean that, among the opposite effects of the ownership 
of shares for managers, the prejudicial ones prevail. 
This first robustness check leads therefore to the conclusion that causality is 
clearly from compensation to performance  for cash components and some stock 
components, while it is ambiguous for options grants and stocks grants. 
Second, we are also concerned that our results may be contingent on the set of 
control variables. To this end, we test the findings with alternative sets of control 
variables. Our estimations contained two sets of control variables, one for corporate 
governance aspects (Shareholders,  BoardMeetings,  Dismissed) and one  for industry-
related factors (Leverage,  Rating,  CurrentLiabilities).  We then re-estimate the model 
with three specifications: without all control variables, with the set of control 
variables for corporate governance aspects only, and with the set of industry-related 
factors only. 
The estimations with these alternative sets of control variables are presented in 
table 4. In a nutshell, most of our findings are robust to the specification of the set of 
control variables. Hence the sign and the significance of the compensation variables 
are not affected, with one exception concerning LTIP. This  variable has always a 
negative  coefficient, but it is only significant when industry-related factors are 
dropped. Therefore, we can conclude that our main findings are robust to the choice 
of control variables. 
Third, we allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between compensation 
components and managerial  performance.  Our findings suggest that several 
compensation components (salary, bonus, and option grants) should be increased in 
order to enhance managerial performance. We must however check whether the 
relation between these compensation components and managerial performance is U-
shaped. It might notably be the case that an optimal level for salary or bonus exists. 
The model is consequently re-estimated by adding squares of compensation 
components to the set of explanatory variables of inefficiency. Results are displayed 
in table 5. Components LTIP and YearStocks remain not significant. We also observe 
that the inclusion of the square of YearOptions leads to the non-significance of both   19 
variables  taking into account  this  component, which may come from collinearity 
between these variables. 
However a striking finding is the positive and significant coefficients for the 
squares  of  Salary  and  Bonus, while the coefficients for Salary  and  Bonus  remain 
significantly negative. This suggests qualifying the view that the increase of the cash 
components  of compensation fosters managerial performance. Indeed there exist 
optimal levels for salary and bonus, which are respectively USD 1.9m and 13.4m. 
Therefore the optimal salary represents about 3 times the mean salary observed for 
our sample (USD 625.3m), but is below the maximal value observed (USD 3,654.8m). 
Similarly the optimal bonus is largely above the mean bonus in our sample (USD 
574.7), but is exceeded by some observations as the maximum bonus is USD 16,500m. 
As a consequence, we do not support the view that salary and bonus for CEOs 
should be enhanced without limits for performance reasons.  A ceiling might be 
implemented for these compensation components.  Nevertheless, our findings 
suggest that cash compensation should be increased for many companies to favor 
firm performance. 
To sum it up, robustness checks confirm the beneficial impact of salary and 
bonus on managerial performance, but they show the existence of an optimal level 
over which managerial performance would be hampered by increases in cash 
compensation. Moreover they rather support the positive impact of the ownership of 
stock options on managerial performance even if they show an ambiguous causality 
between these both dimensions. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
The research presented here has provided new evidence on the relationship 
between CEO compensation and managerial performance. We use frontier efficiency 
scores to measure performance to evaluate  this issue on an extensive dataset 
including information on all components of compensation on a large panel of US 
public firms. 
We find that greater CEO compensation is associated with greater managerial 
performance. However the impact of CEO compensation on managerial performance 
differs according to the investigated component of compensation. That is, the   20 
increases of salary, annual bonus, or the option  grants  contribute to enhance 
managerial performance, while the stock grants are worthless. 
Our findings do not however support the view of unlimited increases in CEO 
compensation, as we observe the existence of an optimal level for salary and for 
bonus over which managerial performance could fall. As these optimal levels are far 
beyond the mean values for salary and bonus, we nonetheless suggest that cash 
compensation could be enhanced to favor managerial performance. 
In the debate on the role of executive compensation to address the agency 
problems in the firm, our results tend to support the “optimal contracting approach” 
according to which CEO compensation provides  incentives  for  managerial 
performance. We therefore do not corroborate the view of Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 
2004) considering executive compensation as the result of the degree of managerial 
power. 
The normative implications of our findings are therefore that CEO 
compensation scheme can be designed to favor managerial performance. Optimal 
compensation should however take into account the differentiated impact of 
compensation components and the existence of an optimal level for some 
components.  Under these limits, our findings tend to support the  use of  option 
grants  to favor managerial performance and to provide some qualified economic 
justifications for high levels of CEO salary and bonus.  
This  first glance at the impact of CEO compensation on managerial 
performance leaves some questions unsolved. Notably, one can wonder whether 
similar findings can be observed in other countries than the US in which tax issues, 
compensation practices, corporate  governance practices in the decision of CEO 
compensation, and also tax issues for compensation components, may be different. 
This opens avenues for further research. 
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Appendix A. Description of variables 
 
Variable  Description 
Variables for efficiency scores 
Production  Net sales 
Labor (L)  Number of employees 
Physical capital (K)  Amortization and depreciation expenses 
Compensation variables 
TotalCompensation  All components of compensation received during the year 
(=Salary +Bonus +LTIP +YearShares +YearOptions) 
Salary  Fixed annual salary 
Bonus  Annual bonus 
LTIP  Grants (employee stock-options and/or restricted shares) subject 
to a “vesting period”, provided in a Long Term Incentive Plan 
(LTIP) framework 
Delta  Partial derivative of the Black-Scholes stock option value to the 
value of the underlying stock. Measures the incentives given by 
stock options to CEOs. 
Vega  Partial derivative of the Black-Scholes stock option value to the 
volatility of the underlying stock. Measures the incentives for 
managers to invest in risky projects. 
TotalStocks  Total stocks holdings 
TotalOptions  Total stock options holdings 
YearStocks  Stock grants during the year 
YearOptions  Option grants during the year 
Control variables 
Shareholders  Log of the number of registred shareholders in thousands 
BoardMeetings  Number of board meetings during the year 
Dismissed  Dummy variable equal to one if the CEO has been dismissed 
from the firm during the period of study, and zero else 
Leverage  Ratio of total debt to total assets 
Rating  Standard and Poor’s long-term credit rating scores, from 1 (AAA) 
to 6 (D) 
CurrentLiabilities  Ratio of short-term liabilities to total liabilities 
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Appendix B. CEO portfolios’ computations 
 
A summary of our variables’ definitions and calculations related to the stock-based 
compensation of each CEO can be found in this appendix. In what follows, we specially insist 
on the proxies chosen for managerial ownership and more broadly managerial incentives. 
We do know the number of ESO granted each year to each CEO included in the 
database, as well as the strike, the vesting period and other specific features of these employee 
stock options, such as stock volatility and so on. For a given year, it’s in consequence quite 
simple to calculate the value of these grants, by simply using the Black-Scholes formula (with 
the Merton addition for dividends). It’s also straightforward to obtain delta for these grants. 
Since Compustat Execucomp details the yearly number of exercised stock-options, one 
can, under the hypothesis that the exercised stock-options are always the eldest in-the-money 
options
6
The point here is to obtain the total value of stock-options held by a CEO. It’s easy to 
obtain from the yearly numbers of option grants and exercised stock-options the net increase or 
decrease of the number of stock-option ownership. And we know the initial total value of 
stock-options already owned by the CEO when he is for the first time present in our database 
(the initial stock, to put it another way), computed by Compustat with the Black and Scholes 
method. We also know the number of such options which are in-the-money. But additional 
information, especially strike, is missing for these options. 
, also find the annual cash flow provided by the stock-option exercises to the CEO. 
An approximation is thus made to take account of these “old” stock-options, following 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2005). We estimate for the first year of inclusion of a given CEO in our 
sample an average strike price, K, for the stock-options he already holds. This estimation relies 
upon the stock price P the total value of stock-options V and the number of in-the-money 
stock-options N. Given the following equality: V = N × (P  − S), one can extract the average 
strike, K, of all ‘old’ stock-options. We therefore assume that all out-of-the-money options 
have no value at all, that is, no time value. Another approximation is made regarding the 
vesting period of these options. With no information at all on the subject, we allot to these 
options the average vesting period in our sample (4 years). 
Once these computations made, one can obtain the dollar value of the CEO option-
holdings, CEO option-holdings sensitivity to market value of firm (what we call the global 
delta), since each grant’s delta is the partial derivative of the option value with respect to the 
underlying asset price. The global delta is simply the weighted average of these deltas. Vega is 
                                                         
6 We here follow Hall and Liebman (1998). It’s the only way given the data available to obtain a yearly 
average exercise price for exercised stock-options.   25 
computed in the same way, as the partial derivative of the option value with respect to the 
volatility of the underlying asset. 
Turning to managerial ownership proxies, we closely follow the variables definitions of 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2005), focusing our attention to the CEO. We simply use the weight of 
the managerial ownership, in percentage or in value (using the end-of-year stock value for the 
valuation). Once again, two distinct approaches can be followed, the first one focused on the 
annual grant of restricted stocks (flow approach) and the other related to the CEO portfolio of 
restricted stocks (stock approach). We do have enough information to compute both proxies 
and to use them alternatively in our regressions. 




The table below provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in the estimations. Definition of 
variables appears in the Appendix A.  Production and physical capital are in thousand dollars. 
Compensation variables are in thousand dollars, with the exception of Delta and Vega. 
CurrentLiabilities  and  Leverage  are in percentage.  Shareholders  is the log of the number of 




  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
Variables for efficiency scores 
Production  1,573,409.2  3,781.0  64,457.1  99,807,638.8 
Labor (L)  8,390  3,865  243  480,103 
Physical capital (K)  78,492.3  4,271.6  1,420.5  13,426,692.7 
Compensation variables 
Totcomp  4,629.0  9,250.3  160.5  297,000.0 
Salary  625.3  293.6  20.8  3,654.8 
Bonus  574.7  790.2  0  16,500.0 
LTIP  162.9  658.3  0  15,105.0 
Delta  0.7  0.2  0  1 
Vega  0.4  0.2  0  1 
TotalStocks  57,653.2  612,000.0  0  37,300,000.0 
TotalOptions  14,052.7  79,834.2  0  3,430,000.0 
YearStocks  291.4  1,698.0  0  66,991.0 
YearOptions  2,790.9  8,301.0  0  295,000.0 
Control variables 
Shareholders  1.9  1.7  -3.1  9.9 
BoardMeetings  7.3  2.8  1  26 
Dismissed  0.1  0.2  0  1 
Leverage  0.6  0.2  0.1  1 
Rating  4.1  1.7  1  6 








Each column presents a stochastic frontier model estimated using maximum likelihood. Definitions of 
variables appear in the Appendix A. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an 
estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industries and 
years are included in the regressions but are not reported. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Intercept  1.130  ***  (0.051)  1.394  ***  (0.057)  1.382  ***  (0.058) 
Ln L  0.250  ***  (0.022)  0.222  ***  (0.022)  0.220  ***  (0.022) 
Ln K  0.541  ***  (0.026)  0.481  ***  (0.026)  0.481  ***  (0.026) 
(Ln L)²  -0.047  ***  (0.005)  -0.041  ***  (0.004)  -0.041  ***  (0.004) 
(Ln K)²  -0.033  ***  (0.004)  -0.027  ***  (0.004)  -0.027  ***  (0.004) 
(Ln L) (Ln K)  0.087  ***  (0.008)  0.080  ***  (0.008)  0.081  ***  (0.008) 
Intercept  4.857  ***  (0.112)  5.196  ***  (0.106)  5.183  ***  (0.106) 
TotalCompensation  -0.005  ***  (0.001)    -      -   
Salary    -    -0.375  ***  (0.034)  -0.372  ***  (0.035) 
Bonus    -    -0.103  ***  (0.015)  -0.109  ***  (0.015) 
LTIP    -    -0.006    (0.024)  -0.014    (0.028) 
Delta    -    0.213  ***  (0.034)  0.221  ***  (0.034) 
Vega    -    -0.403  ***  (0.049)  -0.410  ***  (0.048) 
TotalStocks    -    -0.001    (0.016)    -   
TotalOptions    -    -0.389  ***  (0.128)    -   
YearStocks    -      -    4.361    (3.599) 
YearOptions    -      -    -2.535  ***  (0.795) 
Shareholders  -0.046  ***  (0.004)  -0.030  ***  (0.004)  -0.031  ***  (0.004) 
BoardMeetings  -0.002    (0.002)  -0.004  **  (0.002)  -0.004  **  (0.002) 
Dismissed  0.019    (0.019)  -0.001    (0.019)  -0.003    (0.019) 
Leverage  -0.774  ***  (0.042)  -0.709  ***  (0.038)  -0.711  ***  (0.038) 
Rating  0.030  ***  (0.004)  0.015  ***  (0.004)  0.014  ***  (0.004) 
CurrentLiabilities  -0.725  ***  (0.033)  -0.654  ***  (0.028)  -0.657  ***  (0.029) 
Log-likelihood  -1094.787  -865.908  -867.520 
Number of obs.  5224  5224  5224 
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Table 3 
Robustness checks: Results with lagged values for explanatory variables 
 
Each column presents a stochastic frontier model estimated using maximum likelihood. Definitions of 
variables appear in the Appendix A. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an 
estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industries and 
years are included in the regressions but are not reported. 
 
 
  Coef.    Std. Err. 
Intercept  5.069  ***   (0.121) 
Ln L  0.191  ***   (0.028) 
Ln K  0.565  ***   (0.033) 
(Ln L)²  -0.043  ***   (0.005) 
(Ln K)²  -0.038  ***   (0.005) 
(Ln L) (Ln K)  0.090  ***   (0.010) 
Intercept  1.565  ***   (0.064) 
Salary(t-1)  -0.332  ***   (0.039) 
Bonus(t-1)  -0.100  ***   (0.016) 
LTIP(t-1)  -0.004     (0.018) 
Delta(t-1)  0.182  ***   (0.040) 
Vega(t-1)  -0.399  ***   (0.053) 
YearStocks(t-1)  12.760  **   (6.394) 
YearOptions(t-1)  -1.031     (1.099) 
Shareholders(t-1)  -0.033  ***   (0.005) 
BoardMeetings(t-1)  -0.004  **   (0.002) 
Dismissed(t-1)  -0.220     (0.162) 
Leverage(t-1)  -0.815  ***   (0.051) 
Rating(t-1)  -0.008  *   (0.004) 
Currentliabilities(t-1)  -0.714  ***   (0.036) 
Log-likelihood  -614.907 
Number of obs.  3,733 
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Table 4 
Robustness checks: Results with alternative sets of control variables 
 
Each column presents a stochastic frontier model estimated using maximum likelihood. Definitions of 
variables appear in the Appendix A. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an 
estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industries and 




  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Intercept  5.245 *** (0.108)       5.090 *** (0.105)       5.121*** (0.107)      
Ln L  0.170 *** (0.023)       0.228 *** (0.022)       0.172*** (0.023)      
Ln K  0.467 *** (0.027)       0.502 *** (0.025)       0.488*** (0.027)      
(Ln L)²  - 0.050 *** (0.005)       - 0.040 *** (0.004)       - 0.047*** (0.005)      
(Ln K)²  - 0.034 *** (0.004)       - 0.027 *** (0.004)       - 0.034*** (0.004)      
(Ln L) (Ln K)  0.105 *** (0.008)       0.078 *** (0.008)       0.102*** (0.008)      
Intercept  0.800 *** (0.047)       -  0.612*** (0.042)      
Salary  - 0.526 *** (0.042)       - 0.405 *** (0.034)       - 0.600*** (0.046)      
Bonus  - 0.194 *** (0.022)       - 0.105 *** (0.014)       - 0.222*** (0.024)      
LTIP  - 0.106 *** (0.037)       0.001        (0.016)       - 0.128*** (0.042)      
Delta  0.236 *** (0.036)       0.326 *** (0.033)       0.358*** (0.037)      
Vega  - 0.441 *** (0.058)       - 0.429 *** (0.048)       - 0.451*** (0.065)      
YearStocks  2.295        (6.099)       3.532        (3.790)       1.135       (7.311)      
YearOptions  - 3.326 *** (1.042)       - 2.944 *** (0.793)       - 4.420*** (1.340)      
Shareholders  - 0.036 *** (0.005)       -  - 
BoardMeetings  - 0.006 *** (0.002)       -  - 
Dismissed  - 0.206        (0.168)       -  - 
Leverage  -  - 0.707 *** (0.039)       - 
Rating  -   - 0.011 *** (0.003)       - 
CurrentLiabilities  -  - 0.672 *** (0.029)       - 
Log-likelihood  -1189.426  -905.811  -1225.414 
Number of obs.  5224  5224  5224 
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Table 5 
Robustness checks: Tests for non-linearities 
 
Each column presents a stochastic frontier model estimated using maximum likelihood. Definitions of 
variables appear in the Appendix A. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an 
estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industries and 
years are included in the regressions but are not reported. 
 
 
  Coef.    Std. Err. 
Intercept  5.224  ***   (0.109) 
Ln L  0.215  ***   (0.022) 
Ln K  0.487  ***   (0.025) 
(Ln L)²  -0.041  ***   (0.004) 
(Ln K)²  -0.028  ***   (0.004) 
(Ln L) (Ln K)  0.082  ***   (0.008) 
Intercept  1.550  ***   (0.061) 
Salary  -0.586  ***   (0.057) 
Salary²  0.154  ***   (0.029) 
Bonus  -0.107  ***  (0.015) 
Bonus²  0.004  **   (0.002) 
LTIP  -0.014     (0.020) 
LTIP²  0.003     (0.002) 
Delta  0.221  ***   (0.334) 
Vega  -0.436  ***   (0.045) 
YearStocks  4.844     (6.101) 
YearStocks²  -42.767     (128.973) 
YearOptions  -0.290     (1.629) 
YearOptions²  -28.467     (20.362) 
Shareholders  -0.032  ***   (0.004) 
BoardMeetings  -0.003  *   (0.002) 
Dismissed  -0.187     (0.140) 
Leverage  -0.664  ***   (0.039) 
Rating  -0.011  ***   (0.003) 
CurrentLiabilities  -0.653  ***   (0.028) 
Log-likelihood  -852.691 
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